Impartiality in the ethics of Adam Smith and Immanuel Kant as the foundation of public reason and political liberalism

Abstract

This article offers a comparative examination of the notion of impartiality in Adam Smith and Immanuel Kant, with the aim of evaluating its normative projections in contemporary liberal political theory. While Smith grounds impartiality in sympathy and imagination, crystallized in the figure of the impartial spectator, Kant conceives it as an a priori rational principle, expressed in the categorical imperative and the autonomy of the will. The analysis shows that both models, despite their methodological and epistemological differences, converge in demanding that morality transcend individual egoism and adopt an impartial or universal perspective. The study argues that a synthesis between Smith’s empathetic flexibility and Kantian universality enables the articulation of a more robust conception of moral impartiality, one capable of addressing the challenges of plural societies. To this end, the notion of public reason is introduced as a political category that translates ethical impartiality into institutional legitimacy: laws and policies must be justified with arguments accessible to all free and equal citizens. It is concluded that the integration of both traditions offers a promising normative foundation for liberalism, insofar as it combines moral sensitivity with rational coherence in the pursuit of just institutions.