Institutional Conditions for the Durability of Democracy
Abstract
El artículo pretende identificar las condiciones institucionales para la durabilidad de la democracia. Desde la revisión de las condiciones generales de su surgimiento y permanencia, se abarcan las discusiones introducidas por Seymour Lipset, Ronald Inglehart, Juan Linz, y Robert Putnam. Las conclusiones señalan que las instituciones formales que reducen el conflicto relativo a la competencia electoral inciden positivamente en la durabilidad de la democracia. Por su parte, un capital social que enfatice las normas de reciprocidad y las redes de compromiso cívico intuitivamente afectaría a que la democracia sobreviva.
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