Deontic powers and social epistemology: An approach to testimony based on John Searle's philosophy of society
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.31207/colloquia.v12i1.202Keywords:
Testimony, deontic powers, social epistemology, social ontology, philosophy of societyAbstract
This article explores the possibility of a systematic link between John Searle's philosophy of society and social epistemology based on testimony, as well as the deontic powers associated with testimonial exchange. Testimony is considered an epistemic phenomenon, and the practice of testimony corresponds to the epistemic agent's duty to act as a guarantor of truth, testify honestly, and be capable of reevaluating the epistemic status of one's testimony. To do this, the elements that comprise Searlean social ontology are examined to understand his philosophy of society the first place. The relationship between the assignment of status functions and institutional facts, and the establishment of constitutive rules is made explicit. This generates the emergence of deontic powers associated with our social roles. Second, traditional definitions of testimony in social epistemology are analyzed, considering the importance of role division for a comprehensive understanding of testimonial exchange. Finally, three deontic powers are proposed in relation to the practice of testimony.
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