Estatuto ético y antropológico de las inteligencias artificiales
DOI :
https://doi.org/10.31207/colloquia.v12i1.187Mots-clés :
Cosas, dignidad, ética aplicada, inteligencia artificial, personaRésumé
Las inteligencias artificiales forman parte de la vida cotidiana de cada vez más ciudadanos de todo el mundo: desde el estudiante que las utiliza para hacer los deberes y la anciana que ataja con ellas su soledad, hasta el empresario que implanta robots para mejorar la productividad de su fábrica o el oficinista que utiliza un chatbot para las gestiones diarias.
Que forman parte de “nuestro mundo” es un hecho indiscutible. La cuestión, por recordando el famoso libro de Scheler, es la de su puesto en ese mundo, es decir: ¿Qué son las inteligencias artificiales en el marco de “lo humano”?
En este artículo diseñamos una “teoría de teorías” para analizar la cuestión sobre el estatuto ético y antropológico de las inteligencias artificiales. Nos parece que esta es la primera piedra en el camino hacia una regulación normativa de las relaciones entre las inteligencias artificiales y las personas humanas.
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